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A THIRTY-YEAR RETROSPECTIVE OF 





I am delighted and honored to participate in this conference recognizing the 
thirtieth anniversary of the National Sports Law Institute. When tasked with 
identifying important legal developments impacting college athletics over the 
past thirty years; however, I quickly realized that the evolving college athletics’ 
legal landscape generated a plethora of possibilities. In attempting to narrow my 
long initial list, I decided to focus on developments that transcended the narrow 
legal issue that a court decided or the specific issue addressed by a legislative 
enactment. With this imperfect guiding principle, what follows is my humble 
attempt to identify key legal developments. I apologize in advance if your 
favorite case or other legal development fails to appear below. If it provides any 
solace, it more than likely appeared on my initial list. 
I. THE STUDENT-ATHLETE/UNIVERSITY RELATIONSHIP 
A. Contractual Relationship and Academic Opportunity 
Ross v. Creighton University1  
Kevin Ross, who was recruited to play basketball at Creighton University, 
entered the university with substantially lower academic predictors than most 
 
 John W. & Ruth H. Turnage, Professor of Law, Wake Forest University, School of Law. Professor Davis 
appreciate the research assistance of law students, Ryan Madden and Maurice Goldston.  This article is based 
off of a presentation of the same name given by Professor Davis, as part of the Legal Issues in Collegiate 
Athletics: A 30-year Perspective panel, during the National Sports Law Institute of Marquette University Law 
School’s 30th Anniversary conference held in Milwaukee, on Friday, October 18, 2019.  
1. Ross v. Creighton Univ., 957 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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Creighton students.2 During his time at Creighton, Ross obtained 96 of the 128 
credits he needed to graduate.3 Several of these credit hours were earned in 
classes that did not count toward his degree.4 Ross left Creighton without a 
degree and with the language skills of a fourth grader and the reading skills of a 
seventh grader.5 
Ross asserted several theories in a lawsuit against Creighton. Among them, 
Ross asserted an educational malpractice claim arising from Creighton’s alleged 
failure to provide him with a meaningful education and prepare him for post-
college employment.6 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection 
of Ross’s claim.7 Both courts adhered to judicial precedent refusing to recognize 
educational malpractice claims against educational institutions and adopted 
commonly articulated policy reasons including: (1) the difficulties inherent in 
establishing a uniform standard of care given the difference in approaches to 
education and the often subjective nature of the educational process;8 (2) the 
uncertainties inherent in educational malpractice claims relating to causation 
and measuring damages for breach;9 (3) the potential flood of litigation and 
liability exposure of schools that would likely ensue if such a claim were 
recognized;10 and (4) academic abstention—judicial reticence to interfere in 
educational matters given educators’ presumptive greater expertise regarding 
educational matters than courts.11 
The Seventh Circuit, like the district court, also rejected Ross’s negligent 
admission claim, which would have allowed tort relief if an institution admits 
academically under-prepared student-athletes but fails to adequately assist them 
in taking advantage of the institution’s educational opportunities.12 The court 
rejected this claim based on policies, including: (1) the difficulty of developing 
a definable standard of care;13 (2) the risk of unduly interfering with colleges’ 
admissions decisions and the potential harm to prospective students and society 
 
2. Id. at 411. 
3. Id. at 412.  
4. Id.  
5. See id.  
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 415. 
8. See id. at 414. 
9. Id.  
10. Id. 
11. See id. at 414–15.  
12. Id. at 415. 
13. Id. 
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at large;14 and (3) the possibility that institutions would be reluctant to admit 
marginal students if doing so exposes institutions to tort liability.15 
Ross also asserted a breach of the contract claim based on Creighton’s 
alleged failure to provide him with a meaningful opportunity to participate in 
and benefit from Creighton’s educational program.16 Finding that the student-
athlete/university relationship is contractually based, the court rejected Ross’s 
breach of contract claim to the extent that it was merely restating an educational 
malpractice claim based on the deficient quality of the education Ross allegedly 
received at Creighton.17 In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on the same 
policy reasons on which it rejected Ross’s educational malpractice claim.18 The 
court carved out a specific promise exception, under which a cognizable 
contract cause of action arises if a student-athlete can establish that the 
university made a specific promise that it failed to fulfill (e.g., promising to 
provide specific services and failing to do so).19 
Ross has merited a place on the most significant legal developments for the 
following reasons:  
 
• Ross reaffirmed the contractual nature of the student-athlete/university 
relationship.  
• Ross also, however, rejected the student-athlete’s attempt to have the court 
imply terms and thereby impose obligations on institutions beyond those 
expressly stated in the parties’ contract document. Courts in subsequent 
cases have been reluctant to imply terms into the student-
athlete/university express contract.20 
• Although Ross was unsuccessful in his lawsuit, the notoriety surrounding 
his and similar instances of recruited student-athletes not developing 
educationally during their time in college influenced NCAA academic-





16. Id. at 415–16. 
17.  Id. at 416.  
18. Id. For a thorough discussion of the issues and the court’s reasoning in Ross, see generally Timothy 
Davis, An Absence of Good Faith: Defining a University's Educational Obligation to Student-Athletes, 28 
HOUS. L. REV. 743 (1991). 
19. See Ross, 957 F.2d at 417. 
20. E.g., McCants v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 201 F. Supp. 3d 732 (M.D.N.C. 2016); Jackson v. 
Drake Univ. 778 F. Supp. 1490 (S.D. Iowa 1991). 
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B. NCAA Academic Reform Legislation 
Beginning in the early 2000s, the NCAA has promulgated academic reform 
legislation that reduces the likelihood of another Kevin Ross-type scenario 
occurring. Some of the more important of these reform measures are discussed 
below.   
1. Satisfactory Progress Rules 
In 2002, the NCAA enacted “satisfactory progress rules” which require 
student-athletes to enroll in a curriculum that enhances their ability to make 
progress toward obtaining a degree.21 The legislation provides:  
 
14.4.1 Academic Status. To be eligible to represent an 
institution in intercollegiate athletics competition, a student-
athlete shall maintain progress toward a baccalaureate or 
equivalent degree at that institution as determined by the 
regulations of that institution subject to controlling legislation 
of a conference or similar association of which the institution is 
a member and applicable NCAA legislation. (Revised: 5/29/08, 
4/15/09).22  
 
Measures in place to facilitate this progress include certain benchmarks that 
must be obtained by student-athletes as they progress through college. One such 
benchmarks pertains to an athlete’s program toward obtaining a degree.  
 
14.4.3.2 Fulfillment of Percentage of Degree Requirements. 
A student-athlete who is entering his or her third year of 
collegiate enrollment shall have completed successfully at least 
40 percent of the course requirements in the student’s specific 
degree program. A student-athlete who is entering his or her 
fourth year of collegiate enrollment shall have completed 
successfully at least 60 percent of the course requirements in 
the student’s specific degree program. A student-athlete who is 
entering his or her fifth year of collegiate enrollment shall have 
completed successfully at least 80 percent of the course 
requirements in the student’s specific degree program. The 
course requirements must be in the student’s specific degree 
 
21. See Academic Progress Rate Timeline, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/ 
resources/research/academic-progress-rate-timeline (last visited Apr. 24, 2020). 
22. NCAA, 2019–20 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 14, 14.4.1, at 174 (Aug. 1, 2019) [hereinafter NCAA 
DIVISION I MANUAL]. 
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program (as opposed to the student’s major). (Adopted: 1/10/92 
effective 8/1/92, Revised: 1/9/96, 10/31/02, effective 8/1/03).23  
2. Enhanced Initial Eligibility Rules 
In November 2002, the NCAA also passed legislation that drastically 
changed its initial eligibility rules.24 The revised rules “deemphasize[d] 
standardized test scores (i.e., the SAT and ACT) [and] place[d] greater emphasis 
on high school grades . . .”25 The legislation also increased, however, the number 
of high school core course requirements that athletes must take in order to be 
eligible to obtain an athletic scholarship and participate in intercollegiate 
athletics.26 In support of revised approach, the late NCAA president Myles 
Brand stated the following rationale:  
 
The goal in developing the most recent eligibility models was 
to maximize graduation rates while minimizing disparate 
impact . . . We believe that eliminating the test-score cut will 
increase access and that the new progress-toward-degree 
benchmarks—particularly in the student-athlete’s first two 
years—will put athletes on track to graduate at even higher 
rates than they already do.27 
 
In 2012, the NCAA again heightened its Division I initial eligibility 
standards.28 These standards, which became effective August 1, 2016, 
introduced substantial changes to high school core course requirements such as 
when athletes must complete core courses during high school and the GPAs that 
must be attained in such courses.29  
 
3. Academic Progress Rate 
 
In May 2004, the NCAA developed a metric known as the Academic 
Progress Rate (APR), which is calculated by examining each intercollegiate 
 
23. Id. at art. 14.4.3.2. 
24. MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION 130 (5th ed. 2019). 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. NCAA News, NCAA News Archive - 2003, NCAA NEWS, Sept. 1, 2003, 
https://ncaanewsarchive.s3.amazonaws.com/2003/Division-I/athlete-graduation-rates-continue-climb---9-1-
03.html. 
28.  See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 130.  
29. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 22, art. 14.3. 
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athletic team of member institutions.30 The measure focuses on whether 
scholarship players on each team have remained academically eligible to 
participate in intercollegiate athletics and whether the players have chosen to 
remain enrolled at the school.31 Teams are awarded one point for meeting each 
of these standards during a given semester, resulting in each athlete potentially 
earning the school a maximum of two points per semester and four points per 
year.32 Each team gets a final APR score which can be as high as 1,000.33  
The NCAA initially established a benchmark of 925.34 A failure of a team 
to reach a 925 benchmark exposed a college to penalties including scholarship 
and recruiting restrictions and a team’s loss of postseason competition 
eligibility.35 Effective 2012–13, the NCAA increased the APR benchmark to 
930 (corresponding to a fifty percent graduation rate).36 “Overall APR numbers 
released over the past several years indicate positive trends.”37 The overall four-
year APR was 983 for the 2017–18 academic year.38 The 983 APR compares to 
a 979 APR reported for the 2014–15 academic year.39  
Heightened NCAA academic requirements increase that likelihood that 
student-athletes will benefit educationally during their time in college.40 Some 
evidence of this is reflected in increased student-athlete graduation rates over 
the past twenty to thirty years. 41 
  
 
30. See id. at art. 3.2.4.5, art. 14.02.2. 
31. Academic Progress Rate Explained, NCAA RESEARCH, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/ 
research/academic-progress-rate-explained (last visited Apr. 24, 2020). 
32. Id. 
33. See id.  
34. MITTEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 131. 
35. Id. 
36. See id. at 131. 
37. Id. 
38. Michelle Brutlag Hosick, Division I College Athletes Match Record-High Academic Performance, 
NCAA NEWS (May 8, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/division-i-
college-athletes-match-record-high-academic-performance. 
39.  
40. See Michelle Brutlag Hosick, College Athletes Graduate at Record High Rates, NCAA NEWS (Nov. 
14. 2018, 1:00 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/college-athletes-graduate-
record-high-rates. 
41.  See id. 
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C. Student-Athletes: Employees? 
1. Workers’ Compensation 
Waldrep v. Texas Employers Insurance Association.42 
In 1972, Kent Waldrep signed a letter of intent and statement of financial 
aid committing him to play football for Texas Christian University (“TCU”).43 
During an intercollegiate football game, Waldrep suffered a career ending spinal 
cord injury that left him paralyzed from the neck down.44 Alleging he was an 
employee of TCU, Waldrep filed a worker’s compensation claim against TCU 
for his injury.45 The jury instruction defined an “‘employee’ as ‘a person in the 
service of another under a contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, 
whereby the employer has the right to direct the means or details of the work 
and not merely the result to be accomplished.’”46 In finding in favor of TCU, 
the jury failed to specify whether its decision was based on it having found that 
no contract of hire existed between Waldrep and TCU or that TCU had no right 
to direct the means of Waldrep’s work.47 The issue before the court was whether 
there was a scintilla of evidence to support the jury’s finding based on either 
ground.48  
The court first addressed whether Waldrep and TCU had entered into a 
contract to hire.49 The court found that notwithstanding Waldrep’s receipt of an 
athletic scholarship for participating in university-sponsored athletics, the 
parties had no expectation that Waldrep thereby became a paid university 
employee.50 In support of its conclusion, the court cited to a fundamental NCAA 
policy “to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational 
program and the athlete as an integral part of the student body, and, by so doing, 
retain a clear line of demarcation between college athletics and professional 
sports.”51 The court stated that NCAA policies and rules in effect “exhibited a 
concerted effort to ensure that each school governed by these rules made certain 
 
42. Waldrep v. Tex. Emp’rs Ins. Ass’n., 21 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App. 2000). 
43. Id. at 696. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 698. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 697 (“We will uphold the jury’s findings if more than a mere scintilla of evidence supports it.”). 
49. See id. at 698 
50.  See id. at 698–701. 
51. Id. at 700. 
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that student-athletes were not employees.”52 The court added that the 
surrounding circumstances—including the inability of TCU to fire Waldrep and 
the fact that neither TCU nor Waldrep treated the athletic scholarship as 
income—further supported its and the jury’s finding.53   
Turning to the right of control, the court concluded that even though the 
TCU “exercised direction and control over all of the athletes in its football 
program”54 TCU did not have the “right to direct or control all of Waldrep’s 
activities during his tenure at the school.”55 The court added that “Waldrep’s 
acceptance of financial aid from TCU did not subject him to any extraordinary 
degree of control over his academic activities.”56 
Waldrep’s significance lies, in part, in the court’s unwillingness to 
recognize student-athletes for workers’ compensation as employees of their 
colleges and universities.57 In so ruling, the court established precedence on 
which subsequent courts would rely.58 
2. Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) 
Dawson v. NCAA59   
A dismissed University of Southern California (“USC”) linebacker, Lamar 
Dawson, alleged that the NCAA and Pac-12 violated the FLSA and the 
California Labor Code by not paying college football players a minimum wage 
or overtime pay.60 In considering three factors critical to employee status under 
an economic reality test, the court concluded: (1) Dawson’s scholarship from 
USC engendered no expectation of compensation from the NCAA or the PAC-
12 because neither defendant provided him with a scholarship;61 (2) the 
NCAA’s and PAC-12’s regulatory roles did not convey upon either entity the 
power to fire or hire Dawson—neither entity selected who would play on the 
football team nor had any actual supervisory power over players;62 and (3) 
 
52. Id. 
53. See id. at 700–01. 
54. Id. at 702 (emphasis in original). 
55. Id.  
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 697–702 
58. E.g., Berger v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 843 F.3d 285, 292 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing to Waldrep 
as supporting the proposition that student-athletes generally are not employees of their colleges and 
universities). 
59. Dawson v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 932 F.3d 905 (9th Cir. 2019). 
60. See id. at 908.  
61. Id. at 909. 
62. Id. at 909–10. 
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NCAA rules were not promulgated or implemented in an effort to evade the 
law.63 The court also held that “under California law, student-athletes are 
generally deemed not to be employees of their schools.”64   
3. Unionization 
Northwestern University & College Athletes Players Association (CAPA), 
Petitioner65 
During the 2013–2014 academic year, a total of 112 members (including 
eighty-five scholarship athletes) of the Northwestern University football team 
petitioned the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) about acquiring the 
necessary status to collectively bargain.66 An NLRB regional director ruled that 
the athletes were employees for purposes of establishing their right to form a 
union within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act 
and thereby were entitled to choose whether to be represented for collective-
bargaining purposes.67 In reaching this conclusion, the regional director focused 
on the degree of control that Northwestern possesses over its football players.68 
Northwestern appealed his decision.69 
In 2015, the NLRB for Region 13, declined to exercise jurisdiction.70 
Electing not to determine whether student-athletes are employees, the Board 
concluded that even if Northwestern scholarship football players constitute 
statutory employees:  
 
Our decision is primarily premised on a finding that, because of 
the nature of sports leagues (namely the control exercised by 
the leagues over the individual teams) and the composition and 
structure of FBS football (in which the overwhelming majority 
of competitors are public colleges and universities over which 
the Board cannot assert jurisdiction), it would not promote 
stability in labor relations to assert jurisdiction in this case.71 
 
63. Id. at 910. 
64. Id. at 913. Accord, Berger v. NCAA, 843 F.3d 285, 294 (7th Cir. 2016); Shephard v. Loyola 
Marymount Univ., 102 Cal. App. 4th 837, 846 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002). 
65.  362 N.L.R.B. 1350 (2015). 
66. Id. at 1351. 
67. Id. at 1356. 
68. Id. at 1352. 
69. Id. at 1350. 
70. Id. at 1355. 
71. Id. at 1352. 
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The Board expressed concern that the nature of FBS football consisting of 
125 colleges of which all but seventeen are public universities would be 
disrupted given that it would be unlikely that the Board could assert jurisdiction 
over the public institutions.72  
 
[A]sserting jurisdiction in this case would not promote stability 
in labor relations. Because most FBS teams are created by state 
institutions, they may be subject to state labor laws governing 
public employees. Some states, of course, permit collective 
bargaining by public employees, but others limit or prohibit 
such bargaining. At least two states—which, between them, 
operate three universities that are members of the Big Ten—
specify by statute that scholarship athletes at state schools are 
not employees. . . .asserting jurisdiction would not [promote 
stability] because the Board cannot regulate most FBS teams.73 
 
The Board also declined to exercise jurisdiction because of the recent 
evolution in the way institutions treat student-athletes in regards to the duration of 
scholarships and definition of what constitutes a scholarship.74 The Board stated: 
“For example, the NCAA’s decision to allow FBS teams to award guaranteed 4-
year scholarships, as opposed to 1-year renewable scholarships, has reduced the 
likelihood that scholarship players who become unable to play will lose their 
educational funding, and possibly their educational opportunity.”75  
The forgoing decisions demonstrate: 
 
• The difficulty that student-athletes have encountered in persuading courts to 
recognize them as employees of their colleges, their conferences, and/or the 
NCAA. 
• The tendency of courts to accept the NCAA’s characterization of the nature 
of student-athletes’ relationships with their institutions and to adopt the 
NCAA’s amateurism model. 
  
 
72. Id. at 1354. 
73. Id. at 1354. 
74. Id. at 1355. 
75. Id. 
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D. Antitrust Law and Student-Athlete Compensation 
1. Antitrust 
O’Bannon v. NCAA76 
In a class action lawsuit, then current and former Division I basketball 
players asserted that they were entitled to receive a share of the compensation 
that their institutions had earned from using the athletes’ names, images and 
likenesses (“NILs”) in videos, broadcasts and other footage.77 The district court 
ruled that NCAA rules prohibiting athletes from receiving compensation for 
their NILs constituted an unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman 
Act in that the rules were more restrictive than required to maintain the NCAA’s 
legitimate goal of maintaining amateurism.78 The district court issued an 
injunction enjoining the NCAA from “prohibiting its member schools from 
giving student-athletes scholarships up to the full cost of attendance at their 
respective schools and [requiring Division I institutions to give] up to $5,000 
per year in deferred compensation, to be held in trust for student-athletes until 
after they leave college.”79   
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that NCAA amateurism rules are not 
exempt from antitrust scrutiny and must be analyzed under the Rule of Reason.80 
It agreed with the district court that a proper alternative to the NCAA’s 
compensation rule was to permit student-athletes to receive up to the full cost 
of attendance.81 It disagreed, however, with the district court’s deferred 
compensation award.82   
 
[T]he district court clearly erred in finding it a viable alternative 
to allow students to receive NIL cash payments untethered to 
their education expenses. . . . We cannot agree that a rule 
permitting schools to pay students pure cash compensation and 
a rule forbidding them from paying NIL compensation are both 
equally effective in promoting amateurism and preserving 
consumer demand. Both we and the district court agree that the 
NCAA’s amateurism rule has procompetitive benefits. But in 
 
76. 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
77. Id. at 1055–56. 
78. Id. at 1052–53. 
79. Id. at 1053. 
80. Id. at 1057. 
81. Id. at 1075–76. 
82. Id. at 1079. 
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finding that paying students cash compensation would promote 
amateurism as effectively as not paying them, the district court 
ignored that not paying student-athletes is precisely what makes 
them amateurs.83 
 
As delineated below, O’Bannon’s significance cannot be understated:    
 
• The Ninth Circuit held that the compensation rules regulate commercial 
activity and fixed an aspect of the “price” that recruits pay to attend 
college.84 Like Law, discussed infra, the O’Bannon district and appellate 
courts recognized that restraints on inputs are subject to antitrust 
purview.85 
• The Ninth Circuit accepted the NCAA’s argument that certain of its 
amateurism rules are necessary to preserve the line of demarcation 
between college and professional sports and thereby preserve college 
sports as a distinctive product.86  
• Both the district and appellate courts, however, rejected the NCAA’s 
argument that its amateurism rules are presumed valid as a matter of law. 
The Ninth Circuit held that whether NCAA amateurism rule will survive 
antitrust review “must be proved, not presumed.”87 
• Both courts accepted the NCAA’s argument that its compensation rules 
served two procompetitive purposes: “integrating academics with 
athletics” and “preserving the popularity of the NCAA’s product by 
promoting its current understanding of amateurism.”88 According to the 
Ninth Circuit: 
 
[The] district court found, and the record supports that there is 
a concrete procompetitive effect in the NCAA’s commitment 
to amateurism: namely, that the amateur nature of collegiate 
sports increases their appeal to consumers. We therefore 
conclude that the NCAA’s compensation rules serve the two 
procompetitive purposes identified by the district court. . . .89  
 
 
83. Id. at 1079 (emphasis in original). 
84. Id. at 1073. 
85. Id. at 1053, 1063–64. 
86. Id. at 1076. 
87. Id. at 1064. 
88. Id. at 1073. 
89. Id. at 1073. 
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• The Ninth Circuit rejected, however, the NCAA’s procompetitive 
justifications that its compensation rules promote competitive balance and 
that they increase output in the college education market.90   
In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation91 
In this case, the district court judge who adjudicated O’Bannon, Judge 
Wilken, held that student athlete eligibility rules that limit: “(1) the grant-in-aid 
at not less than the cost of attendance; (2) compensation and benefits unrelated 
to education paid on top of a grant-in-aid; (3) compensation and benefits related 
to education provided on top of a grant-in-aid[,]”92 “constitute horizontal price-
fixing agreements enacted and enforced with monopsony power.”93  
The court concluded: 
 
While Defendants have shown that limiting student-athlete 
compensation has some effect in preserving consumer demand 
for Division I basketball and FBS football as compared with no 
limit, Plaintiffs have shown that not all of the challenged rules 
are necessary to achieve this effect and that a less restrictive 
alternative set of rules would be virtually as effective as the set 
of challenged rules, without requiring significant costs to 
implement. The less restrictive alternative would remove 
limitations on most education-related benefits provided on top 
of a grant-in-aid, while allowing the NCAA to limit cash or 
cash-equivalent awards or incentives for academic achievement 
or graduation to the same extent it limits athletics awards. 
Limits on compensation and benefits not related to education 
and a limit on the grant-in-aid at not less than the cost of 
attendance would remain.94  
 
In short, the court enjoined the NCAA from prohibiting universities from 
providing tangible items related to the pursuit of academic studies (e.g., 
computers and musical instruments and study abroad expenses).95 It permitted 
 
90. Id. at 1072. (“We therefore accept the district court’s factual findings that the compensation rules do 
not promote competitive [balance and] that they do not increase output in the college education market . . .”). 
91. 375 F. Supp.3d 1058 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
92. Id. at 1101.  
93. Id. at 1109. 
94. Id.  
95. Id. 
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the NCAA “to limit academic and graduation awards and incentives . . . 
provided in cash or a cash-equivalent to a level that the record shows is not 
demand-reducing or inconsistent with NCAA amateurism . . . .”96 Both sides 
have appealed. 
Ultimately, the significance of this case is:  
 
• The NCAA obtained a partial victory in that plaintiffs were denied what 
they most desired—invalidation of all NCAA limits on compensation for 
student-athlete services.  As a result of the ruling, colleges and universities 
are constrained from unfettered competition for the services of student-
athletes. 
• It was a partial victory for student-athletes in that the court expanded the 
scope of permissible educational benefits and removed any cap on the 
educational benefits that colleges and universities can provide to student-
athletes.97 Thus, such benefits provides another means by which 
institutions can compete for the services of student-athletes. 
Alston v. NCAA98 
On December 6, 2017, Judge Wilken approved a $208.7 million settlement 
the NCAA agreed to pay as damages99 relating to the lawsuit filed by student-
athletes who alleged that the cap limiting scholarships at less than the true cost 
of attendance violated federal antitrust laws.100 Recently, more than 43,000 
Division I men’s and women’s basketball players and Football Bowl 
Subdivision football players who played during from March 2010 through the 
2016–17 seasons, began receiving their payments averaging approximately 
$3,800.101 The complete breakdown is as follows: 
 
• “More than 8,100 checks are for amounts between $5,000 and $10,000. 
• Nearly 1,300 are for amounts between $10,000 and $20,000. 
 
96. Id. at 1106. 
97. Id.  at 1110. 
98. Complaint, Alston v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 2014 WL 843274 (N.D. Cal.) (No. 
3:14CV01011). 
99. Andy Berg, NCAA Begins Paying Out $208M in Settlement Money, ATHLETIC BUSINESS (October 
2019), https://www.athleticbusiness.com/civil-actions/ncaa-finally-begins-paying-out-208m-in-settlement-
money.html?eid=306479770&bid=2535782. 
100. Complaint ¶ 110, Alston, 2014 WL 843274 (No. 3:14CV01011).  
101. Berg, supra note 99. 
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• There are [fourteen] for $20,000 or more, including one for a little more 
than $36,000.”102   
2. State Legislation 
California SB 206—The Fair Pay to Play Act103 
On September 30, 2019, California governor, Gavin Newsom, signed SB 
206 known as the Fair Pay for Play Act (“the Act”).104 Effective January 1, 2023, 
the legislation will permit student-athletes attending four-year colleges to obtain 
compensation, from third parties, for the use of athletes’ names, images, and 
likenesses.105 The Act achieves this by prohibiting colleges and universities 
from enforcing any rule promulgated by an athletic conference or athletic 
association (e.g., the NCAA) that prohibits student-athletes from receiving 
third-party compensation for their NIL.106 The Act specifically prohibits athletic 
conferences or athletic associations from prohibiting student-athletes from 
participating in intercollegiate athletics because the athlete received 
compensation from the use of her/his NIL.107 The Act permits student-athletes 
to be represented by professionals (e.g., agents and attorneys) duly licensed in 
California for purposes of assisting athletes in seeking compensation from third 
parties for their use of athletes’ NILs.108  
The Act specifically prohibits colleges from compensating their student-
athletes for the use of athletes’ NILs.109  It also prohibits a student-athlete from 
entering into contract related to her/his NIL if such contract would conflict with 
a “provision of the athlete’s team contract.”110 





103. CAL. EDUC CODE § 67456 (West 2019). 
104. Allen Kim, California Gov. Gavin Newsom Passed SB 206 that Allows College Athletes to Get Paid, 
CNN.COM (Sept. 30, 2019, 4:01 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/30/sport/california-sb-206-ncaa-
trnd/index.html. 
105. CAL. EDUC CODE § 67456 (West 2019). 
106. Id. § 67456(a)(2). 
107. Id.  
108. Id. § 67456(c). 
109. Id. § 67456(b).  
110. Id. § 67456(e)(1). 
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Senate Bill No. 206 
CHAPTER 383 
An act to add Section 67456 to, and to add and repeal 
Section 67457 of, the Education Code, relating to collegiate 
athletics. 
BILL TEXT 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA DO 
ENACT AS FOLLOWS: 
SEC. 2. 
Section 67456 is added to the Education Code, to read: 
67456. 
(a) (1) A postsecondary educational institution shall not 
uphold any rule, requirement, standard, or other limitation that 
prevents a student of that institution participating in 
intercollegiate athletics from earning compensation as a result 
of the use of the student’s name, image, or likeness. Earning 
compensation from the use of a student’s name, image, or 
likeness shall not affect the student’s scholarship eligibility. 
(2) An athletic association, conference, or other group or 
organization with authority over intercollegiate athletics, 
including, but not limited to, the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, shall not prevent a student of a postsecondary 
educational institution participating in intercollegiate athletics 
from earning compensation as a result of the use of the student’s 
name, image, or likeness. 
(3) An athletic association, conference, or other group or 
organization with authority over intercollegiate athletics, 
including, but not limited to, the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, shall not prevent a postsecondary educational 
institution from participating in intercollegiate athletics as a 
result of the compensation of a student athlete for the use of the 
student’s name, image, or likeness. 
(b) A postsecondary educational institution, athletic 
association, conference, or other group or organization with 
authority over intercollegiate athletics shall not provide a 
prospective student athlete with compensation in relation to the 
athlete’s name, image, or likeness. 
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(c) (1) A postsecondary educational institution, athletic 
association, conference, or other group or organization with 
authority over intercollegiate athletics shall not prevent a 
California student participating in intercollegiate athletics from 
obtaining professional representation in relation to contracts or 
legal matters, including, but not limited to, representation 
provided by athlete agents or legal representation provided by 
attorneys. 
(2) Professional representation obtained by student athletes 
shall be from persons licensed by the state. Professional 
representation provided by athlete agents shall be by persons 
licensed pursuant to Chapter 2.5 (commencing with Section 
18895) of Division 8 of the Business and Professions Code. 
Legal representation of student athletes shall be by attorneys 
licensed pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 6000) 
of Chapter 4 of Division 3 of the Business and Professions 
Code. 
(3) Athlete agents representing student athletes shall 
comply with the federal Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust 
Act, established in Chapter 104 (commencing with Section 
7801) of Title 15 of the United States Code, in their 
relationships with student athletes. 
(d) A scholarship from the postsecondary educational 
institution in which a student is enrolled that provides the 
student with the cost of attendance at that institution is not 
compensation for purposes of this section, and a scholarship 
shall not be revoked as a result of earning compensation or 
obtaining legal representation pursuant to this section. 
(e) (1) A student athlete shall not enter into a contract 
providing compensation to the athlete for use of the athlete’s 
name, image, or likeness if a provision of the contract is in 
conflict with a provision of the athlete’s team contract. 
(e)(2) A student athlete who enters into a contract 
providing compensation to the athlete for use of the athlete’s 
name, image, or likeness shall disclose the contract to an 
official of the institution, to be designated by the institution. 
(e)(3) An institution asserting a conflict described in 
paragraph (1) shall disclose to the athlete or the athlete’s legal 
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representation the relevant contractual provisions that are in 
conflict. 
(f) A team contract of a postsecondary educational 
institution’s athletic program shall not prevent a student athlete 
from using the athlete’s name, image, or likeness for a 
commercial purpose when the athlete is not engaged in official 
team activities. It is the intent of the Legislature that this 
prohibition shall apply only to contracts entered into, modified, 
or renewed on or after the enactment of this section. 
(g) For purposes of this section, “postsecondary 
educational institution” means any campus of the University of 
California or the California State University, an independent 
institution of higher education, as defined in Section 66010, or 
a private postsecondary educational institution, as defined in 
Section 94858. 
(h) This section shall become operative on January 1, 
2023.111  
 
Following the National Sports Law Institute’s 30th anniversary conference, 
the NCAA took an important step.  In October 2019, the NCAA Board of 
Governors voted to adopt a report of its NCAA Federal and State Legislation 
Working Group that the NCAA’s three divisions immediately begin considering 
modifications of their bylaws to permit student-athletes to profit from their 
NILs.112  
 
It is the policy of the Association that NCAA member schools 
may permit students participating in athletics the opportunity to 
benefit from the use of their name, image and/or likeness in a 
manner consistent with the values and beliefs of intercollegiate 
athletics. To effectuate this change, the Board of Governors 
directs each of the three divisions to immediately begin 
considering modification and modernization of relevant NCAA 
bylaws and rules in harmony with the following principles and 
guidelines:  
• Assure student-athletes are treated similarly to non-athlete 
students unless a compelling reason exists to differentiate.  
 
111. Id. at § 67456. 
112. NCAA, REPORT OF THE NCAA BOARD OF GOVERNORS OCTOBER 9, 2019, MEETING 1, (Oct. 29, 
2019), https://ncaaorg.s3.amazonaws.com/committees/ncaa/exec_boardgov/Oct2019BOG_Report.pdf. 
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• Maintain the priorities of education and the collegiate 
experience to provide opportunities for student-athlete success.  
• Ensure rules are transparent, focused and enforceable and 
facilitate fair and balanced competition.  
• Make clear the distinction between collegiate and professional 
opportunities.  
• Make clear that compensation for athletics performance or 
participation is impermissible.  
• Reaffirm that student-athletes are students first and not 
employees of the university.  
• Enhance principles of diversity, inclusion and gender equity.  
• Protect the recruiting environment and prohibit inducements 
to select, remain at, or transfer to a specific institution.113 
• SB 206 enactment fostered similar legislation. Other states in which 
similar measures are in various stages of the legislative process include 
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, 
New York, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.114 
• Federal legislation has been proposed or is being proposed on the national 
level.115 In December 2019, NCAA president Mark Emmert opined that 
federal legislation addressing student-athlete NIL compensation is likely 
to be promulgated.116 
• The Act defies the longstanding NCAA rule prohibiting student-athletes 
from individually profiting from their NILs. It has the potential to 
significantly erode the NCAA’s amateurism model. 
• The Act also stimulated important discussions regarding the NCAA’s 
conceptualization of amateurism and whether refusing to permit student-




113. Id. at 3–4. 
114. Brock Fritz, Oklahoma, Mississippi Mull Pay-to-Play Legislation, ATHLETIC BUS. (Jan. 2020) 
https://www.athleticbusiness.com/governing-bodies/oklahoma-mississippi-considering-pay-to-pay-
legislation.html; Jason Scott, California Law Prompts States to Consider Copycats, ATHLETIC BUS. (Oct. 
2019), https://www.athleticbusiness.com/civil-actions/california-law-prompts-states-to-consider-
copycats.html. 
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II. NCAA GOVERNANCE RESTRUCTURE & STUDENT-ATHLETE WELLNESS  
A. Autonomy Legislation 
In 2015, the NCAA changed its Division I governance structure to afford 
autonomous decision-making powers to the Power Five Conferences—the 
Atlantic Coast Conference (“ACC”), the Big Ten Conference, the Big 12 
Conference, the Pac-12 Conference, and the Southeastern Conference 
(“SEC”).118 The Board delegated new authority to the Power Five Conferences 
to control policy development with respect to matters, including student-athlete 
health and wellness, meals and nutrition, certain aspects of financial aid, 
expenses and benefits pertaining to enrollment, insurance, and career pursuits119. 
In passing the autonomy legislation, the NCAA created an independent 
legislative authority.120 
With their newfound legislative authority, the autonomy conferences have 
passed legislation that have had a profound impact on student-athlete wellness. 
Some of the more important of these legislative actions, as well as actions before 
the NCAA modified its governance structure, are discussed below.  
B. Student-Athlete Wellness 
1. Multi-Year Scholarships.  
Pursuant to legislation the NCAA adopted in 1973, its rules restricted 
institutions to awarding to student-athletes one-year renewable athletic 
scholarships.121 Effective August 2012, however, NCAA-amended legislation 
permits colleges and universities to award multi-year scholarships for up to five 
years.122 After the passage of the autonomy legislation, three of the five 
autonomy conferences, the Big-Ten, the Pac-12 and the Big-12, adopted policies 
offering multi-year scholarships in all sports. 123  
Consistent with its multi-year scholarship legislation, in 2015 the NCAA 
adopted legislation seeking to protect the integrity of multi-year scholarships. 
2015 NCAA legislation prevents colleges and universities from reducing a 
 
118. Brian D. Shannon, The Revised NCAA Division I Governance Structure After Three Years: A 
Scorecard, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 65, 67 (2017).  
119. Id. at 79–80. 
120. Id. at 73. 
121. See generally, NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 22. 
122. Id. art. 15.02.8. 
123.  Timothy Davis, Expanding Student-Athlete Benefits: Are There Costs?, 5 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 43, 
45 (2016). 
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student-athlete’s multi-year scholarship for athletic reasons, injury, or illness.124  
i.  True Cost of Attendance  
The centerpiece of NCAA legislation passed by autonomy schools in 
January 2015 with an effective date of August 1, 2015, was a redefinition of 
permissible financial aid.125 Prior to this legislation, “a student-athlete could 
receive athletically related financial aid limited to tuition and fees, room and 
board, and required course-related books.”126 Under the true cost of attendance 
legislation, an athletic scholarship was “redefined to encompass not only tuition, 
room, board, books, and fees, but also the incidental costs of attending college, 
such as transportation and miscellaneous personal expenses.”127 This legislation 
provides in part: “A student-athlete may receive institutional financial aid based 
on athletics ability . . . [and] up to the value of a full grant-in plus any other 
financial aid up to the cost of attendance.”128 “The cost of attendance legislation 
is mandatory for autonomy schools but permissive for non-autonomy schools. 
Due to competitive pressures, certain non-autonomy schools offer full-cost 
financial aid.”129  
ii.  Easing of Transfer Restrictions 
Before October of 2018, student-athletes seeking to transfer to another 
school, had to first obtain the permission of their coaches before contacting other 
schools to discuss the possibility of transferring.130 Institutions wishing to 
recruit student-athletes interested in transferring were required to obtain the 
permission of the athletes’ schools.131 Under the new rule, student-athletes are 
afforded greater control of the transfer process. An athlete can begin the transfer 
process and seek a scholarship at a different school by notifying their coaches 
of her/his desire to transfer.132 Within two business days of such notification, 
the coach must enter the athletes’ name in an NCAA-managed database that 
identifies athletes who may be recruited by another college or university. 
Thereafter, other schools may recruit the athletes identified in the database.133 
 
124. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 22, art. 15.3.4.3. 
125. Davis, supra note 123, at 43..  
126. Id. at 44.  
127. Id.  
128. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 22, art. 15.1. 
129. Davis, supra note 123, at 45. 
130. MITTEN ET AL., supra note 24, at 119. 
131. Id. 
132. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 22, art. 13.1.1.3.1. 
133. Id.  
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iii.  Other Legislation 
Other changes geared toward student-athletes, include:  
 
permit[ting] student-athletes to borrow against their future 
professional earnings to purchase loss-in-value insurance 
(Division I Bylaw 12.1.2.4.4); expanded reimbursement or 
payment of travel expenses for certain family members to 
attend certain events (Division I bylaw 16.1.1); provided 
unlimited food (Division I Bylaw 16.5.2.5); and require[ing] 
schools to pay for medical care for athletics-related injuries for 
at least two years after graduation (Division I Bylaw 16.4.1).134 
III. TITLE IX 
A. Participation Opportunities 
Cohen v. Brown University135 
In 1991, Brown University demoted its women’s gymnastics and volleyball 
teams from university-funded varsity status to donor-funded varsity status.136 
Brown similarly demoted its men’s water polo and golf teams.137 In 1993-94, 
men comprised 61.87 percent and women 38.13 percent, respectively, of the 897 
students who participated on Brown’s intercollegiate varsity athletics teams.138 
Women, however, comprised 51.14 percent of the undergraduate enrollment.139 
Focusing on the resulting 13.01 percent disparity between the percentage of 
female student-athletes on Brown’s varsity athletic teams and the female 
undergraduate student enrollment, members of the demoted women’s teams 
sued Brown alleging a violation of Title IX.140 
The court adopted and applied the Department of Education, Office of Civil 
Rights’ (“OCR”) 1979 three-part test to determine compliance with Title IX in 
regards to participation opportunities:  
 
 
134. In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375  F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1069 
(N.D. Cal. 2019).  
135. 101 F.3d 155 (1st. Cir. 1996) 
136. Id. at 163. 
137. Id. 
138. Id.  
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 163–64. 
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1. Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for 
male and female students are provided in numbers substantially 
proportionate to their respective enrollments; or 
2. Where the members of one sex have been and are 
underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the 
institution can show a history and continuing practice of 
program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the 
developing interests and abilities of the members of that sex; or 
3. Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among 
intercollegiate athletes, and the institution cannot show a 
continuing practice of program expansion such as that cited 
above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and 
abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and 
effectively accommodated by the present program.141  
 
According to the court, an institution complies with Title IX if any prong of 
the three-prong test is established.142  Finding that Brown did not fall within any  
prong, the court ruled that the university’s demotion of the women’s teams 
violated Title IX.143   
Cohen’s significance resides in the following: 
 
• In Cohen, the court adopted, interpreted, and applied the 1978 OCR three-
part test for determining whether participation opportunity had been 
denied.144  
• The court’s focus on the first prong, substantial proportionality, has 
become the most significant of the three standards for assessing 
compliance with Title IX.145 
• Only minor deviations in the proportion of female student-athletes and 
female undergraduate enrolled students will be permitted.146 
• Title IX permits an institution to take affirmative measures to increase 
gender equity and to use statistical evidence of disparity to prove 
 
141. Id. at 166. 
142. See id. 
143. Id. at 166, 169–70. (“[T]he primary arguments [regarding the application of the three-prong test to 
this case] have already been litigated and decided adversely to Brown in the prior appeal.”).  
144. See id. at 166. 
145. See. generally id. at 171. 
146. Id. at 176. 
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discrimination. Therefore, gender conscious remedies are appropriate and 
constitutionally permissible under a federal anti-discrimination statute.147 
• In assessing participation opportunities, it’s impermissible to include the 
number of female junior varsity athletes in determining substantial 
proportionality.148  
• 4 case set the stage for the increase in female varsity athletic participation 
opportunities over the past thirty years. 
B. Title IX and Sexual Harassment: Coaches and Athletes 
Jennings v. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill149  
A female student-athlete alleged that remarks made by her male coach 
created a sexually hostile educational environment in violation of Title IX.150 
The court stated that to establish a cognizable Title IX hostile environment 
claim, a plaintiff must establish:  
 
(1) that she belongs to a protected group (e.g., a student at an 
institution covered by Title IX); (2) that she was subjected to 
harassment based on her sex; (3) that the harassment was 
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an abusive educational 
environment; and (4) a cognizable basis for imputing 
institutional liability under Title IX.151  
 
A three-judge panel found that no reasonable jury could find that the coach’s 
“remarks during [plaintiff’s] two-year tenure on the team were sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to create a sexually hostile educational environment.”152 On 
reconsideration en banc, the Fourth Circuit ruled that the plaintiff alleged 
sufficient facts for a jury to reasonably find that the coach’s persistent 
harassment was sufficiently degrading to young women to create a hostile or 
abusive environment.153  
 
147. Id. at 185. 
148. See id. at 186–87. 
149. 444 F.3d 255 (4th Cir. 2006). 
150. See id. at 260–65. 
151. Id. at 267–68. 
152. Id. at 275. 
153. Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 701 (4th Cir. 2007).  
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Simpson v. University of Colorado Boulder154   
Two female students alleged they were sexually assaulted by football 
players and recruits at a party.155 They asserted that the likelihood that sexual 
assaults would occur was heightened by the university’s adoption of an official 
policy that paired recruits with “female ambassadors” to ensure that the recruits 
would be shown a good time.156  
The court framed the critical issue as whether a risk existed that a sexual 
assault might occur during a recruiting visit.157 The court found evidence 
sufficient to establish such a risk, including: the head football coach’s general 
knowledge of the serious risk of sexual assault during recruiting visits; the 
coach’s specific knowledge that assaults had previously occurred during 
recruiting visits at CU; the coach’s maintenance of an unsupervised player-host 
program notwithstanding this knowledge;  the inadequacy of steps taken by CU 
to reduce the risk of sexual assaults during recruiting visits; and the head 
coach’s resistance to recruiting reform efforts.158 
Baylor University Sexual Harassment Scandal 
In 2016, several female students at Baylor University asserted Title IX 
violations based, in part, on the alleged failure of athletic administrators to 
appropriately address male student-athletes’ sexual assault of female 
students.159 A law firm retained by Baylor to investigate the allegations issued a 
report in which it found widespread shortcomings by the university.160 The 
resulting scandal had several consequences including the NCAA sending a 
notice of allegations to Baylor, termination of the head football coach, 
disciplining of the athletic director and his resignation, and the demotion and 
eventual resignation of the university’s president.161 
 
 
154. 500 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2007). 
155. Id. at 1173. 
156. Id.  
157. Id. at 1180–81. 
158. Id. at 1184–85 
159. See Rachel Axon, Title IX Lawsuits Key to Revealing Real Picture at Baylor, USA TODAY (Oct. 31, 
2016, 8:50 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/big12/2016/10/31/baylor-football-sexual-
assault-lawsuits-title-ix/93085720/. 
160. Id. 
161. Adam Grosbard, Baylor Sexual Assault Scandal Timeline: From Football Convictions to Title IX 
Investigation, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 28, 2016, https://www.dallasnews.com/sports/baylor-
bears/2016/10/28/baylor-sexual-assault-scandal-timeline-from-football-convictions-to-title-ix-investigation/. 
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• The forgoing matters shine the spotlight on the responsibilities of athletic 
administrators, including head coaches and athletic directors at the college 
level, to protect female students from sexual assault and harassment that 
creates a hostile educational environment.  
• These matters also affirm the use of Title IX as a vehicle for recovery 
based on sexual harassment engaged in by coaches or student-athletes, as 
well as coaching conduct that exposes women to a heightened risk of sexual 
harassment by male athletes. 
IV. STUDENT-ATHLETE HEALTH & SAFETY AND TORT LIABILITY 
A. Safety Measures 
Kleinknecht v. Gettysburg College162 
Drew Kleinknecht, a 20-year-old sophomore lacrosse player at Gettysburg 
College, suffered cardiac arrest during a lacrosse practice.163 No athletic trainer 
was present at the practice.164 The Third Circuit held that the college “had a duty 
[of care] to provide prompt and adequate emergency medical services to 
[Kleinknecht], one of its intercollegiate athletes, while he was engaged in a 
school-sponsored athletic activity for which he had been recruited.”165 The court 
stopped short of finding the existence of an all-encompassing special 
relationship between student-athletes and their colleges and universities.166 
Nevertheless, the court’s holding is partially premised on Kleinknecht’s status 
as a student-athlete, which gave rise to the college’s duty of care to its athletes 
to have appropriate medical measures in place given that it is foreseeable that 
an athlete could experience a life threatening medical event during participation 
in intercollegiate athletics.167 
 
• The Kleinknecht case was instrumental in colleges and universities 
implementing safety measures (e.g., having trainers and defibrillators 
present during practices and games) that allow them to promptly respond 




162. 989 F.2d 1360 (3d Cir. 1993). 
163. Id. at 1362–63. 
164. Id.  
165. Id. at 1371. 
166. See id. at 1367–69. 
167. Id.  
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B. Co-Participant Tort Liability 
Avila v. Citrus Community College District168 
Courts have held that a co-participant’s duty to another participant is not to 
increase the inherent risks associated with playing a game.169 This rule was 
extended to shield a college from liability to a player on an opposing team.170 In 
Avila, the court held that although a university has legal duty not to increase the 
risk inherent in an intercollegiate sports, it has no duty to prevent one of its 
pitchers from intentionally throwing at an opposing team’s batter because 
“being intentionally thrown at is a fundamental part and inherent risk of the sport 
of baseball.”171 
C. Physical Impairment 
Knapp v. Northwestern University172  
Northwestern University awarded a basketball scholarship to a student-
athlete who had an internal defibrillator implanted after he experienced sudden 
cardiac arrest during a high school recreational basketball game.173 The athlete 
desired to play basketball, and three cardiologists cleared him to play.174 On the 
advice of its team physician, Northwestern deemed Knapp ineligible to play 
basketball due to the potential risk associated with his heart condition.175 The 
university agreed to honor its scholarship commitment to Knapp, who sued 
alleging the university’s refusal to permit him to play violated the Rehabilitation 
Act.176 
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s injunction issued on behalf 
of Knapp.177 It applied the following standard for determining if a policy or 
conduct violates the Rehabilitation Act: (1) “[the claimant] is disabled as 
 
168. 131 P.3d 383 (Cal. 2006). 
169. E.g., Lowe v. Cal. League of Prof’l Baseball, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 105, 109 (Cal App. 1997); Knight v. 
Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 708 (Cal. 1992).  
170. 131 P.3d at 394. 
171. Id. 
172. 101 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996). 
173. Id. at 476. 
174. See id. at 477–78. 
175. Id. at 476–77. 
176. Id. at 477. 
177. Id. at 485. 
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defined by the Act; (2) he is otherwise qualified for the position sought; (3) he 
has been excluded from the position sought solely because of his disability; and 
(4) the position exists as part of a program or activity receiving federal financial 
assistance.”178  Focusing on whether Knapp established the first prong, the 
claimant is disabled, the court held that a claimant must prove that he/she: “(i) 
has a physical impairment . . . which substantially limits one or more of [the 
claimant’s] major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) 
is regarded as having such an impairment.”179 
The court held that playing intercollegiate basketball was not a “major life 
activity” but instead only part of the major life activity of learning at a college 
or university.180 As stated by the court, “Playing or enjoying intercollegiate 
sports therefore cannot be held out as a necessary part of learning for all 
students.”181  
 
• While recognizing that a college or university is subject to the 
Rehabilitation Act, Knapp illustrates the deference that courts afford 
college and universities.  
• Knapp also is consistent with other decisions finding that participation in 
intercollegiate or interscholastic athletics does not give rise to a property 
interest because it is only one component of the educational process.182 
D. Concussion Litigation 
Arrington v. NCAA was the first class action concussion suit filed against 
the NCAA.183 Similar lawsuits were consolidated into In re Nat’l Collegiate 
Athletic Ass’n. Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litigation.184 On September 
27, 2018, the presiding judge  preliminarily approved a settlement agreement 
requiring the NCAA to pay $70 million to set up a 50-year medical monitoring 
program for college athletes and another $5 million to start a program to 
research the prevention and treatment of concussions.185 The settlement’s 
medical monitoring program will allow for medical screenings and evaluations 
 
178. Id. at 478. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 480.  
181. Id. 
182. See, e.g., Richards v. Perkins, 373 F.Supp. 2d 1211 (D. Kan. 2005); Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of 
Topeka, 690 F.Supp. 940 (D. Kan. 1987); Brands v. Sheldon Community Sch., 671 F.Supp. 627 (N.D. Iowa 
1987); Mayo v. W. Va. Secondary Sch. Activities Comm’n, 672 S.E.2d 224 (W. Va. 2008).  
183.  See In re Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litigation, 2014 WL 
7237208, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2014). 
184. Id.  
185. Id. at *3. 
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for all current and former NCAA student-athletes regardless of the sport or how 
long the athletes played. The settlement imposes requirements on colleges and 
universities such as requiring that medical personnel trained to diagnose and 
treat concussions be present at games involving contact sports. The settlement 
does not prohibit individual plaintiffs from bringing concussion-related suits 
against the NCAA.186 Consequently, numerous concussion lawsuits have been 
filed against the NCAA and/or its member institutions.187 For example, Les 
Williams, who played defensive end at the University of Alabama, is one of 
more than 100 individuals seeking recovery based on allegations that the NCAA 
and athletic conferences failed to warn players of the risk associated with 
concussions.188       
Other notable concussion lawsuits against the NCAA and/or colleges 
include Greiber v. NCAA,189 which involves a female lacrosse player’s suit 
against the NCAA and Hofstra University for concussion-related injuries she 
allegedly sustained while playing lacrosse. The plaintiff alleged the NCAA 
acted negligently in failing to “implement adequate regulations in order to 
address the detection, treatment, and prevention of head injuries.”190 The court 
found that the plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to overcome the NCAA’s motion 
to dismiss because the NCAA owed a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff. 
As to the source of the duty, the court concluded that the NCAA exercised 
control over “rules of play and equipment, and imposed conditions of 
membership on its member institutions, which included requirements regarding 
head-injury protocols.”191  
An 2018 ruling by the Ohio Supreme Court could have potentially far-
reaching effects for similarly-injured plaintiffs in the future.192 In a lawsuit filed 
by the estate of a deceased football player who had CTE, the court became the 
first appeals court to consider whether CTE is a latent disease. Although the 
court did not expressly conclude that CTE qualifies as a latent disease, it did not 
 
186. Id. at *4. 
187. Wave of Concussion Lawsuits to Test NCAA's Liability, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 2019, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2019/02/07/wave-of-concussion-lawsuits-to-test-ncaas-
liability/39022587/.  
188. Jesse Dougherty, Former Alabama Player Les Williams is One of More Than 100 Suing NCAA Over 
Brain Injury, WASHINGTON POST, July 23, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/sports/wp/ 
2018/07/02/feature/former-alabama-player-les-williams-is-one-of-more-than-100-suing-ncaa-over-brain-
injuries/; See also Andy Berg, Former Lineman Sues NCAA Over Parkinson’s, ATHLETIC BUS. (Oct. 2018), 
https://www.athleticbusiness.com/safety-security/former-lineman-files-sues-ncaa-over-parkinson-s.html 
(describing former collegiate lineman Joel Jarosz’ claim against the NCAA).  
189. 2017 WL 6940498 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Sept. 8, 2017). 
190. Id. at *4.   
191. Id. at *5.   
192. Schmitz v. NCAA, 122 N.E.3d 80 (Ohio 2018). 
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rule that the disease does not qualify.193 Thus, the ruling could help athletes in 
the future who suffer from CTE and do not realize that they feel the disease’s 
impact from their previous participation in sports and thereby extend the time 
within which athletes can assert claims.  
V. COACHES 
A. Liquidated Damages Provisions 
Vanderbilt Univ. v. Dinardo194  
The employment contract between a head football coach, DiNardo, and 
Vanderbilt contained reciprocal liquidated damages provisions requiring 
Vanderbilt to pay DiNardo his remaining salary if he was removed as head 
coach during his five-year contract.195 The contract also required DiNardo to 
pay Vanderbilt “an amount equal to his Base Salary, less amounts that would 
otherwise be deducted or withheld from his Base Salary for income and social 
security tax purposes, multiplied by the number of years (or portion(s) thereof) 
remaining on the Contract” if he resigned or otherwise terminated his 
employment as the university’s head football coach.196 After DiNardo resigned 
from his position with Vanderbilt to become LSU’s head football coach, 
Vanderbilt sought to enforce the liquidated damages provision of their 
contract.197  
In rejecting DiNardo’s argument that the provision constituted an 
unenforceable penalty, the court focused on the difficulty of assessing monetary 
damages extending beyond the cost of hiring a new coach. The court observed 
that such difficulty arises from the uniqueness of the head coach position and 
the impact of a coaching change on alumni relations, public support, student-
athlete recruitment, ticket sales, financial contributions to the athletics program, 
the retention of assistant coaches, and the overall stability of the football 
program.198 The court also stated that Vanderbilt did not waive the liquidated 
damages provision by granting DiNardo permission to talk with LSU about its 
coaching position.199 
 
193. See id. at 89 (while not stating that CTE qualifies as a latent disease, the court stated that further 
factual determinations were necessary for determining whether the claim is time barred).   
194. 174 F.3d 751 (6th Cir. 1999). 
195. Id. at 753. 
196. Id. at 754. 
197. Id. at 755. 
198. Id. at 756. 
199. Id. at 757. 
DAVIS – ESSAY 30.2 9/11/2020  10:30 PM 




• The case validates liquidated damages which now are common provisions 
included in coaching contracts.   
B. Antitrust 
Law v. NCAA200  
As a part of its efforts to control the increasing costs of athletics program 
and concomitant deficits experienced by most Division I athletics programs, the 
NCAA adopted a bylaw that capped the salaries of a class of assistant basketball 
coaches who became known as Restricted Earnings Coaches (“REC”).201 Under 
the legislation, RECs’ compensation was limited to $16,000 per year.202 RECs 
challenged the NCAA bylaw as an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation 
of the Sherman Act.203   
The court found that the Sherman Act not only applies to output restraints 
that clearly harm consumer welfare, but also to input market restraints (i.e., 
restraints that harm those who—like coaches—contribute to the production of 
the relevant product).204 Applying the Rule of Reason analysis adopted by the 
Supreme Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents,205 the court held that the salary 
cap violated the Sherman Act as a matter of law because it totally eliminated 
price competition among NCAA member institutions for the services of a class 
of coaches.206 Thus, the REC bylaw had an anticompetitive effect in that it 
artificially lowered the price of coaching services.207 
The court rejected the NCAA’s two procompetitive justifications, 
controlling costs as a means of maintaining competitive balance of teams and 
preserving entry level positions for younger less experienced coaches. On the 
competitive balance justification, the court ruled that the cap of REC’s salaries 
would not achieve this objective because no limit was imposed on the amount 
of money schools could spend on their athletics programs.208 The court also held 
that while preserving entry-level coaching positions for younger less 
 
200. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
201. Id. at 1014. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 1015. 
204. Id. at 1018-19. 
205. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 486 U.S. 85, 117-120 (1984). 
206. 134 F.3d at 1019-20. 
207. Id. at 1020. 
208. Id. at 1024. 
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experienced coaches might be socially desirable, it was not a procompetitive 
economic justification under a Rule of Reason analysis.209  
 
• Law recognizes that restraints on inputs necessary to produce 
intercollegiate athletic competition are subject to antitrust scrutiny under 
the Sherman Act.  
• The case also maintains the distinction recognized in Board of Regents 
between NCAA bylaws that are of a commercial character and likely to 
violate the Sherman Act (e.g., TV contracts and coaches’ salaries) and 
those that are noncommercial in character and are likely to be 
procompetitive (e.g., NCAA recruiting rules and student-athlete 
eligibility rules).  
• Law also removed a potential impediment to the tremendous rise in 
coaches’ salaries that has occurred over the past 20 years. 
VI. NCAA INFRACTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT  
A. Penn State University 
In a controversial 2012 case, which critics argued fell outside of the scope 
of the NCAA enforcement process, the NCAA and Penn State University 
entered into a consent decree related to matters arising out of the sexual abuse 
of young boys that occurred at the university’s athletics facilities.210 The terms 
of the consent decree included Penn State paying a $60 million fine, a four-year 
post-season ban for football, scholarship reductions spanning four years, 
probation, the vacation of wins of the Penn State football team for 1998-2011, 
and certain monitoring and reporting obligations.211 In January 2015, the NCAA 
vacated all the forgoing and other sanctions except for the $60 million fine.212 
The reversal was a part of a settlement of a lawsuit filed by a Pennsylvania state 
senator who challenged the legality of the consent decree.213  
 B. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
In a highly anticipated case, the NCAA’s Committee on Infractions issued 
 
209. Id. at 1021-22. 
210. Matthew J. Mitten, The Penn State “Consent Decree”: The NCAA’s Coercive Means Don’t Justify 
Its Laudable Ends, But is There a Legal Remedy?, 41 PEPP. L. REV. 321, 322 (2014). 
211. Id. 
212. Jeré Longman & Marc Tracy, The Rehabilitation of Joe Paterno, Back at No. 1, NY TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/17/sports/ncaafootball/joe-paterno-penn-state-ncaa-wins-restored. 
html. 
213. Id.  
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a 2017 decision in which it largely exonerated UNC of violations related to 
academic irregularities in its Afro and African American Studies Department. 
The irregularities included independent study classes without supervision by the 
instructor of record, independent study grades given by persons other than the 
instructor of record, lecture classes not requiring class attendance, unauthorized 
grade changes, and independent study classes that were designated as lecture 
classes.214 
The COI concluded that whether conduct constitutes academic fraud is a 
determination that is made at the institutional level. It concluded that because 
UNC did not consider the course irregularities as amounting to academic fraud 
or misconduct; it was outside of the purview of the NCAA to make that 
determination. The COI decision’s significance resides in: 
 
• The ruling limits the extent to which the NCAA can intervene and enforce 
sanctions against its member institutions for academic irregularities. 
• In October 2019, the NCAA Board of Governors declined to consider 
proposed legislation that would have expanded the NCAA’s authority to 
impose sanctions for egregious academic misconduct.215 
C. Changes to the NCAA Enforcement Process 
In 2012, the NCAA’s Division I Board of Directors adopted major changes 
to its enforcement processes. One of the more significant changes was replacing 
the former two-tier structure of major and secondary violations with a four-tier 
structure for identifying rules violations and for imposing sanctions for 
violations.216   
Level I (severe breach of conduct) consists of  “violations that seriously 
undermine or threaten the integrity of the NCAA Collegiate Model, as set forth 
in the constitution and bylaws, including any violation that provides or is 
intended to provide a substantial or extensive recruiting, competitive or other 
advantage, or a substantial or extensive impermissible benefit.”217  
Level II (significant breach of conduct) consists of “violations that provide 
 
214. Jason Scott, NCAA Nixed Academic Fraud Recommendations, ATHLETIC BUS. (Oct. 2019), 
https://www.athleticbusiness.com/governing-bodies/documents-ncaa-rejects-academic-fraud-
recommendations.html; See also Staff, Timeline of the UNC Investigation, NEWS OBSERVER (April 25, 2016), 
https://www.newsobserver.com/sports/college/acc/unc/article73760402.html. 
215.  Jeremy Bauer-Wolf, NCAA Does Not Move Forward With New Academic Reform Rules, Inside 
Higher Ed (Sept. 5, 2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/09/05/ncaa-does-not-move-forward-
new-academic-reform-rules. 
216.  Timothy Davis & Christopher T. Hairston, Majoring in Infractions: The Evolution of the National 
College Athletic Association’s Enforcement Structure, 92 OR. L. REV.979, 1002 (2014). 
217. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 22, art. 19.1.1 
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or are intended to provide more than a minimal but less than a substantial or 
extensive recruiting, competitive or other advantage . . . or . . . conduct that may 
compromise the integrity of the NCAA Collegiate Model as set forth in the 
constitution and bylaws.”218  
Level III (breach of conduct) consists of “violations that are isolated or 
limited in nature; provide no more than a minimal recruiting, competitive or 
other advantage; and provide no more than a minimal impermissible benefit.”219  
Multiple Level IV violations may collectively be considered a breach of 
conduct. Level IV (incidental issues) consists of minor infractions that are 
inadvertent and isolated, technical in nature and result in a negligible, if any, 
competitive advantage.220 Note that in 2017, the NCAA eliminated the Level IV 
category of violations.221   
In an effort to achieve greater consistency in meting out sanctions, the 
revised enforcement bylaws provide a structure that sets forth a range of 
potential sanctions for each level of violations based on their respective 
severity.222 For example, core penalties for Level I and Level II violations 
include limits on postseason competition, financial penalties (including fines or 
reduction or elimination of revenue sharing in postseason competition), 
recruiting restrictions, scholarship reductions, show-cause orders related to 
disciplinary or corrective actions for individuals who violate NCAA rules, and 
sanctions on head coaches (including suspension).223 Additional Level I and 
Level II penalties are enumerated in Bylaw 19.9.7. Penalties imposed for Level 
III violations range from deeming student-athletes ineligible, to suspension of 
athletic personnel, to scholarship reductions.224  
In imposing penalties, the Committee of Infractions can take into account 
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, which may alter the standard 
penalties.225 The penalty structure provides guidance on the penalties to impose 
if any such factors are present. 
Effective August 1, 2019, NCAA enforcement includes a new independent 
infractions process, the Independent Accountability Resolution Process. The 
process has been described as follows: 
 
 
218. Id. at art. 19.1.2. 
219. Id. at art. 19.1.3. 
220. NCAA, 2015–16 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 19.1.4, at 314 (Aug. 1, 2015). 
221 . For a discussion of the rationale for the modification, see Division I Proposal- 2017-7, NCAA 
LSDBI, https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/search/proposalView?id=100647.   
222. NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL, art. 19.1. 
223. Id at art. 19.9.5. 
224. Id. at art. 19.9.8. 
225. Id. at art. 19.9.2. 
DAVIS – ESSAY 30.2 9/11/2020  10:30 PM 
2020]    THIRTY YEARS OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS  343 
 
 
The change brings independent investigators, advocates and 
decision-makers to the infractions process to minimize 
perceived conflicts of interest and to add different perspectives 
to the review of infractions matters. Select complex cases will 
be eligible for the independent process. Examples of complex 
cases include alleged violations of core NCAA values, such as 
alleged failures to prioritize academics and the well-being of 
student-athletes; the possibility of major penalties; or conduct 
contrary to the cooperative principles of the existing infractions 
process.226 
 
NCAA Bylaw 19.11 provides that an infractions matter may be referred to 
such a panel if doing so will best serve the interests of the organization.227 
D. College Basketball Scandal 
In September 2017, following a two-year FBI investigation of college 
basketball coaches, sports agents, and Adidas executives, federal prosecutors 
issued a criminal complaint against four assistant men’s basketball coaches: 
Chuck Person (Auburn University), Tony Bland (University of Southern 
California), Emanuel “Book” Richardson (University of Arizona), and Lamont 
Evans (Oklahoma State University).228 The defendants allegedly solicited bribes 
and wire services arising from coaches funneling money from Adidas 
executives to the families of high school basketball recruits as part of efforts to 
influence basketball recruits to attend and play basketball at universities 
affiliated with Adidas.229 Each of the coaches pled guilty and received sentences 
ranging from community service and probation to time in jail.230 
The scandal led to the termination of Rick Pitino as head coach of the 
Louisville’s men’s basketball team.231  It will likely lead to the NCAA asserting 
 
226. New Independent Infractions Process Launches, NCAA (Aug. 1, 2019, 1:41 PM), 
http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/new-independent-infractions-process-launches. 
227. Id.  
228. Mitch Sherman, Everything You Need to Know About the College Basketball Scandal, ESPN (Feb. 
23, 2018), www.espn.com/mens-college-basketball/story/_/id/22555512/explaining-ncaa-college-basketball-
scandal-players-coaches-agents.   
229. Id.  
230. See Andrew Denney, Another Ex-NCAA Coach Gets Prison Time in Bribery Scandal, NY POST, June 
7, 2019 https://nypost.com/2019/06/07/another-ex-ncaa-coach-gets-prison-time-in-bribery-scandal/; see also 
Kyle Boone, College Basketball Corruption Trial: Ex-Auburn Assistant Chuck Person Avoids Prison Time, 
CBS SPORTS (July 17, 2019, 2:36 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/college-basketball/news/college-
basketball-corruption-trial-ex-auburn-assistant-chuck-person-avoids-prison-time/. 
231. Sherman, supra note 230. 
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charges against institutions as exemplified by the Notice of Allegations, alleging 
Level I violations were committed by University of Kansas’s men’s basketball 
team, its head coach Bill Self, and assistant coach Kurtis Townsend.232  The 
Notice of Allegations asserts a lack of institutional control by Kansas.233 
E. College Admission Scandal 
In March 2019, federal prosecutors revealed an illicit college admission 
scheme tied, in part, to NCAA athletics. Rick Singer, the scheme’s mastermind, 
“admitted to funneling portions of $25 million in bribes from rich parents to 
coaches, test-cheaters and others to get their children into some of the nation's 
top universities,” including Georgetown, Yale, Stanford, University of Southern 
California, UCLA, and Wake Forest.234 One aspect of the scheme, dubbed 
‘Varsity Blues,’ allegedly involved coaches helping “undeserving students” 
gain admissions to elite universities by portraying the students as top athletes 
when they were not.235 To date, Meredith, Center, Janke, and Khosroshahin have 
agreed to plead guilty, and Vandemoer has already pled guilty and been 
sentenced to one day in prison (already served), two years of supervised release, 
and a $10,000 fine.236 
Among the coaches facing federal charges are: Jovan Vavic (USC Men’s 
Water Polo Coach), Gordon Ernst (Georgetown Men’s and Women’s Tennis 
Coach), William Ferguson (Wake Forest Women’s Volleyball Coach), Jorge 
Salcedo (UCLA Men’s Soccer Coach), Ali Khrosroshahin (USC Women’s 
Soccer Coach), Laura Janke (USC Assistant Women’s Soccer Coach), Rudy 
Meredith (Yale Women’s Soccer Coach), John Vandemoer (Stanford Sailing 
Coach), and Michael Center (Texas Men’s Tennis Coach).237  
 
• As a result of the scandal, colleges and universities are reviewing and 
changing their admissions policies and procedures for admitting student-
athletes.  
 
232. Associated Press, Kansas Receives Notice of Allegations From NCAA Alleging Big Violations by 
Basketball Team, USA TODAY, Sept. 23, 2019,  https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaab/2019 
/09/23/kansas-notice-allegations-ncaa-basketball-bill-self/2424843001/. 
233. Id.  
234. Joey Garrison, College Admissions Scandal Tracker: Who’s Pleaded Guilty, Who’s Gone to Prison, 
and Who’s Still Fighting, USA TODAY, May 23, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/ 
nation/2019/05/23/lori-loughlin-felicity-huffman-college-admissions-scandal-rick-singer-guilty-not-guilty-
list/3704724002/. 
235. College Admissions Scandal: Your Questions Answered, NY TIMES, Mar. 14, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/14/us/college-admissions-scandal-questions.html.  
236. Garrison, supra note 236. 
237. Id.  
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• It is unclear if any NCAA rules violations will arise as a result of the 
conduct related to the scandal. 
VII. SPORTS GAMBLING 
Murphy v. NCAA238 
In May 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act violated the 10th Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.239 As a result of the ruling, each state can determine whether to 
legalize sports gambling and establish rules to regulate gambling.240 
In response to the decision, the NCAA Board of Governors created an ad 
hoc Committee on Sports Wagering to address how to best respond to the 
changing wagering landscape. In addition, the NCAA is working with an 
undisclosed entity to develop measures to “protect . . . the integrity of 
competition[s].”241 
 
238. 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018). 
239. Id. at 1485.  
240. Id. at 1484-85. 
241. Stacey Osburn, NCAA, Members Continue to Address Sports Wagering Concerns, NCAA (Aug. 30, 
2019, 12:17 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/ncaa-members-continue-address-
sports-wagering-concerns. 
